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 1. Introduction 
The political nature of public decision-making implies that ﬁscal policy is not necessarily set by a benevolent government,
and thus might not be eﬃcient. Even in Western Europe and North America, considered the most developed regions in the
world, many countries suffer from imperfections in political institutions. A number of recent studies in political economy
have analyzed the impact of political frictions in the form of political turnover, political polarization, or public rent-seeking
on economic outcomes. Each of these frictions has a speciﬁc inﬂuence on ﬁscal variables. Political turnover (uncertainty
about the prospects of reelection) makes the party in power short-sighted relative to the households, leading to ineﬃcient
assets management, such as over-accumulation of public debt ( Persson and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990 ) or
under-investment in physical capital ( Azzimonti, 2011 ). Political polarization (disagreement in society about how the ﬁscal
policy should be conducted) leads to over-spending by the party in power, which, in turn, crowds out private investment
( Azzimonti, 2011; Azzimonti and Talbert, 2014 ). The presence of public rent-seeking results in higher taxes and higher public
debt compared to an economy in which this friction is absent ( Battaglini and Coate, 2008; Yared, 2010 ). 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the importance of these political frictions for ﬁscal policy outcomes using
macroeconomic data and data on political institutions. To that end, we formulate a dynamic political economy model that
combines several political frictions studied in the literature and evaluate how much of the variation in public debt, govern-
ment spending, and taxes can be explained by measures of political stability, public rent-seeking, and political polarizationE-mail address: dgrechna@gmail.com 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2016.06.001 
0147-5967/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Association for Comparative Economic Studies. This is an open access article under 
the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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 in a sample of developed countries. Quantifying the impact of political distortions is important from economic and policy
perspectives. If these distortions account for a signiﬁcant fraction of variation in ﬁscal variables, it may be more eﬃcient to
reform the political system in the worst-performing countries instead of imposing restrictions on spending or borrowing on
their ﬁscal authorities, as has recently occurred in the European Union. We consider developed countries, which allows us
to concentrate on the role of political frictions alone and at the steady state, abstracting from various other institutional and
economic frictions that characterize economies in transition. 
Following related studies, our analysis is based on Lucas and Stokey (1983) type economic model with a lack of com-
mitment by the government. We consider government policy in a differentiable Markov perfect equilibrium, assuming that
the reputational mechanisms are not operative. We add the following political frictions: political turnover (to which we also
refer to as political uncertainty or instability) and non-alignment of government and citizen preferences. The former fric-
tion implies that the governments are short-sighted; the latter friction implies that the government does not maximize the
utility of the representative household. We discuss two interpretations of this second political friction. First, there may be
disagreement in the society about the composition of the public good, with the party in power providing only the public
good that is preferred by its electorate. In this case, the political friction we refer to is political polarization ( Alesina and
Tabellini, 1990; Azzimonti, 2011 ). Second, the government can prefer rent-seeking and divert a fraction of public spend-
ing. In this case, the political friction is public rent-seeking ( Yared, 2010 ). In the considered framework, one parameter
captures political uncertainty, and another parameter can be interpreted as capturing either political polarization or public
rent-seeking. 
We ﬁnd that political turnover or political polarization/public rent-seeking alone cannot explain the pattern of public
debt and government spending in developed countries. Without political turnover, public debt is zero at the steady state,
regardless of the magnitude of the other political friction. Without political polarization/rent-seeking, an increase in public
debt due to a reduction in the government discount factor caused by political uncertainty leads to an increase in private
consumption and a decrease in public consumption. In the data, the correlation of public debt and government spending
is positive. Combining political turnover with political polarization or public rent-seeking allows us to replicate the public
debt - public spending relationship by varying two parameters that govern political frictions. 
The interplay between these frictions in the model is as follows. The incumbent enjoys extra utility when in power
(either because of rent-seeking activities or because of implementing the policies on which the opposition parties do not
agree) and optimally chooses to provide insurance for itself given the uncertain prospects of reelection: The incumbent
leaves higher public debt to its successor, in this way reducing the amount that the opponent, which may become the
government in the next period, can spend. Thus, higher political uncertainty leads to higher public debt and lower public
spending, other things being equal. At the same time, higher preferences for rent-seeking or polarization increase public
spending, other things being equal. The overall consequences for public debt, public spending, and taxes depend on the
prevalence of each friction in the economy. 
We calibrate the model to the data from twenty developed countries and evaluate the contribution of the variation in
political frictions to the variation in ﬁscal variables in these countries. For every country in the sample, we consider the
economic indicators and the measures of political frictions averaged over the period 1995–2007. This time period is dictated
by the data availability (the common measures of public rent-seeking are available starting in 1995) and by the absence
of signiﬁcant economic ﬂuctuations (the Great Recession that followed after 2007 had a signiﬁcant impact on all economic
variables that has not been mitigated by the complete recovery until day). 
The data on political frictions is based on surveys and relies on perceptions. In order to avoid possible shortcomings
of using any particular indicator, we use several measures of political frictions in the data as follows: the World Bank
measure of political stability, the World Bank measure of public rent-seeking (the variables “Political Stability and Absence
of Violence” and “Control of Corruption,” respectively, from the Worldwide Governance Indicators), the Corruption Perception
Index (from the Transparency International), and the Political Polarization measures from Lindqvist and Östling (2010) . We
conclude that the World Bank measures of political stability and public rent-seeking produce the best model results (the
correlation coeﬃcients between the model-generated variables and the data are around 50% for public debt and around 30%
for public spending and taxes). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews some of the related literature. Section 3 describes the ﬁscal
policy model featuring the lack of commitment by the government, political uncertainty, and another political friction,
which can be interpreted either as political polarization or as political rent-seeking. Section 4 discusses the properties of
the model. Section 5 evaluates the impact of political frictions on ﬁscal variables in a sample of twenty developed countries.
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) were among the ﬁrst to show theoretically that political
turnover in the presence of political polarization leads to higher public debt levels in a time-consistent setup. In their work,
as well as in the works of their followers, political polarization is deﬁned as disagreement in the society about the desired
composition of public goods. Thus, political turnover is a consequence of the differences in society preferences and not of
politician misconduct. Azzimonti (2011) endogenizes political turnover in a neoclassical growth setup with political polar-
ization via a voting model in which the outcome of the election is dictated by political preference shock as well as voters’
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 expectations about the economic outcomes. She shows that political turnover and political polarization impair investment
rates and economic growth rates, at the same time leading to excess government spending. Following these authors, we
model political polarization as a disagreement about the composition of public goods; differently from these authors, we
also consider the role of public rent-seeking in shaping economic outcomes. 
If there is no disagreement in the society about the public policy, political turnover can be an instrument for disciplin-
ing politicians for misbehavior such as rent-seeking activities or pork-barrel spending. Battaglini and Coate (2008) build a
political economy model with a legislature that can distribute revenues back to their districts through pork-barrel spending.
Their theory predicts that public debt and taxes are higher than those in an economy without political frictions. Caballero
and Yared (2010) characterize the equilibrium transition path of an economy managed by a sequence of politicians who
face political risks and who care about household welfare and private rents. They ﬁnd that a rent-seeking government over-
borrows and under-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government if the political risk is high relative
to the economic uncertainty and over-saves and over-taxes if the economic volatility is suﬃciently high relative to the po-
litical uncertainty. Yared (2010) studies optimal taxes and debt management in a stochastic economy in the presence of
rent-seeking politicians who can be removed from oﬃce for misbehavior. He ﬁnds that taxes are volatile and persistent
with a rent-seeking government, differently from the benevolent government case, and the rise in debt is eﬃcient in the
sense that it precludes excessive rent-seeking. Acemoglu et al. (20 08a , 20 08b , 2011a , 2011b ), similarly to Yared (2010) , show
that the need to provide incentives to politicians in power creates political economy distortions. They demonstrate that if
politicians are less patient than citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by positive long-run capital
taxation. In the setup we consider in this paper, we evaluate the role of public rent-seeking combined with political uncer-
tainty in determination of public debt, spending, and taxes. Moreover, we compare the performance of the data on public
rent-seeking and the data on political polarization in accounting for variation in public variables. 
The impact of political distortions on ﬁscal outcomes depends on another important characteristic of public policy, which
agrees with the presence of political turnover: the lack of commitment by the government to its ﬁscal plan. As a conse-
quence of the absence of commitment, the government reoptimizes its policy every period. The ﬁscal outcomes under no
commitment can differ from those that would occur under the full commitment by the government even in the absence
of any political frictions. For example, ( Klein et al., 2008 ) use the model of optimal ﬁscal policy with a balanced budget to
show that the lack of commitment leads to less public spending compared to the full commitment environment. Debortoli
and Nunes (2013) ﬁnd that the lack of commitment results in zero public debt at the steady state, differently from the
full commitment case, in which steady-state public debt is determined by the initial conditions. In this paper, similarly to
Debortoli and Nunes (2013) , we study the Markov perfect equilibrium ﬁscal policy using a version of the Lucas and Stokey
(1983) economic model. We add political turnover and political polarization or rent-seeking to the framework considered
by these authors and obtain positive public debt at the steady state, with its level and the level of public spending jointly
determined by the magnitude of the political frictions. 
A number of studies discuss the consequences of political frictions for economic ﬂuctuations. For example, Ales et al.
(2014) demonstrate how economic and political cycles can be jointly determined and production distortions result if poli-
cymakers are non-benevolent, cannot commit to policies, and have private information about the government budget and
rents. Azzimonti (2015) obtains economic ﬂuctuations due to asymmetries in reelection probabilities across parties that
compete for the oﬃce. Aguiar et al. (2009) and Aguiar and Amador (2011) show how political frictions lead to economic
distortions in a small open economy. In this paper, we consider the long-run consequences of political frictions. Therefore,
we analyze economic outcomes in developed countries and use the predictions of the model at the steady state. 
3. Description of the economic environment 
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon economy populated by agents of measure 1, a half of which live in region N, and a half
on which live in region S of the country. Agents work in the production sector for a competitive wage, w t , and enjoy the
consumption of private goods, c t , public goods, g 
J 
t , and leisure, x t . Agent preferences over public good may be region-speciﬁc
(in such case, J ∈ {N,S}; more on this below). Every period, the agents have time endowment of 1, purchase one-period public
bonds from the government, b t+1 , at price q t , pay taxes on their income, τ t , and receive income from previous period public
bonds, b t . Their budget constraint in period t is given by: 
c t + q t b t+1 = (1 − τt ) w t (1 − x t ) + b t . (1)
The agents maximize their life-time utility, 
∑ ∞ 
t=0 βt U(c t , x t , g 
J 
t ) , subject to their budget constraints and given government
policy. The instantaneous utility function, U (.), is increasing and concave in each of its arguments, and β is the discount
factor. The resource constraint in this economy is given by: 
C t + G t = A (1 − X t ) = y t , (2) 
where C t is aggregate consumption, G t is total public spending, 1 − X t denotes total labor, y t is the total output, and A is the
technology parameter. 
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 3.1. Government policy 
There are two political parties that compete for the oﬃce. The incumbent party cannot follow a long-term ﬁscal plan
due to the lack of commitment technology. Moreover, with probability p the incumbent party will stay in the power in the
following period, and with probability 1 − p it will be replaced by its political opponent. Under such conditions, the party
in power plays a game against the opposition taking their policy as given. To characterize government policy, we adopt the
notion of Markov-perfect equilibrium, where policy functions depend only on fundamentals. 
Every period, the party in power decides on the issues of public bonds and the levels of taxes to ﬁnance public spending
and to repay previous period public debt (previous debt obligations are always honored because default is very costly) to
maximize its objective. The incumbent makes decisions about its policy taking into account anticipated next period poli-
cies of itself, if re-elected, or its opponent, if not re-elected. We assume that p is exogenous. Azzimonti (2011) provides
microfoundations for the determinants of p ; in her work, under particular assumptions, endogenously determined p is in-
dependent of economic state variables in equilibrium. 
Consider the following instantaneous utility function of the incumbent party: 
u (c t , x t ) + γ v (g J t ) , (3)
where u (.) and v (.) are increasing and concave in their arguments, γ > 0 and v (0) = v¯ . We refer to two interpretations of
this utility function. 
First, following Azzimonti (2011 , 2015 ), we can assume that g 
J 
t is indexed by region, J ∈ {N,S}, and (3) coincides with the
instantaneous utility function of the agents from region J , U(c t , x t , g 
J 
t ) = u (c t , x t ) + γ v (g J t ) . In this case, there is disagreement
in the population over the desired composition of public expenditures and the party in power provides only its region-
speciﬁc public good. The parameter γ deﬁnes the importance of public good in overall utility of the agent and measures the
degree of polarization in the country (the higher γ , the more important the utility derived from the public good relative to
the utility from the private consumption and leisure and, because agents enjoy utility only from their region-speciﬁc public
good, the higher political polarization in the country). Under such interpretation, political turnover is a natural consequence
of preference heterogeneity in the society. 
Second, we can assume that the ﬁrst term in (3) coincides with the instantaneous utility of the households while the
second term represents utility derived from the private rent of politicians in power, so that U(c t , x t , g 
J 
t ) = u (c t , x t ) . The
parameter γ measures the degree of public rent-seeking (the higher γ , the more weight is put by the politicians in power on
rent-seeking activities relative to the maximization of welfare of the electorate). In this case, the public policy of both parties
is the same and the political turnover is deﬁned by political preferences unrelated to economic outcomes (for example,
moral, ethnic, or religious). 
Under both interpretations, the party out of power enjoys instantaneous utility u (c t , x t ) + γ v¯ . Given that the agent
utility function (3) is either separable in public consumption (under ﬁrst interpretation), or independent of public con-
sumption (under second interpretation), and given that both regions are taxed at the same rate, agent decisions about
private consumption, labor supply, and purchases of public bonds are independent of their region of residence. Therefore,
 t = 1 / 2 c t + 1 / 2 c t = c t , X t = x t , G t = g J t . The agents consumption, work, and saving decisions are determined by (1) and the
following optimality conditions: 
u x (c t , x t ) /u c (c t , x t ) = (1 − τt ) w t , (4)
q t u c (c t , x t ) = βu c (c t+1 , x t+1 ) . (5)
The government announces its policy at the beginning of each period, after being elected or reelected and after observing
the level of inherited debt, b t , before the households make decisions about the variables they control. We use a primal ap-
proach and express the problem of the government in terms of choosing household allocations and savings that implement
optimal ﬁscal policy. In particular, we combine (1), (4) , and ( 5 ) into one implementability constraint by substituting away
taxes and prices, as follows: 
u c (c t , x t ) c t + βu c (c t+1 , x t+1 ) b t+1 − u x (c t , x t )(1 − x t ) − u c (c t , x t ) b t = 0 . (6)
Given the sequence of events and the separability between the economic and political dimensions, the only payoff-relevant
state variable for the government is the level of inherited debt. The government maximizes its value function subject to the
implementability constraint (6) and the resource constraint (2) , given the amount of public bonds to be repaid in the current
period, the presence of political turnover, and the anticipated future policy. Denote as { C (b t+1 ) , X (b t+1 ) } the policy that the
current government anticipates will be followed in the future, so that c t+1 = C (b t+1 ) , x t+1 = X (b t+1 ) . For the remainder of
the paper, we drop time subindices and denote next period variables with a prime. Then, given b , and the perception that
future governments implement { C ( b ), X ( b )}, the problem of the current government can be formulated as follows: 
max 
c,x,b ′ 
u (c, x ) + γ v (A (1 − x ) − c) + β[ pV (b ′ ) + (1 − p) W (b ′ )] , (7)
s.t. : u c (c, x ) c + βu c (C (b ′ ) , X (b ′ )) b ′ − u x (c, x )(1 − x ) − u c (c, x ) b = 0 , (8)
488 D. Grechyna / Journal of Comparative Economics 44 (2016) 484–495 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 where government spending has been substituted away using (2) , V ( b ′ ) is the value function of the party in power, and
W ( b ′ ) is the value function of the party out of power. In equilibrium, the anticipated policy functions will coincide with the
actual policy functions. Government policy in equilibrium is deﬁned as follows. 
A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a set of policy functions { C ( b ), X ( b ), B ( b )} and value functions V ( b ) and W ( b ), such that the
policy functions solve: 
{ C (b) , X (b) , B (b) } = argmax c,x,b ′ u (c, x ) + γ v (A (1 − x ) − c) + β[ pV (b ′ ) + (1 − p) W (b ′ )] 
subject to ( 8 ); and the value functions are given by ( 9 ) and ( 10 ) as follows: 
V (b) = u (C (b) , X (b)) + γ v (G (C (b) , X (b))) + β[ pV (B (b)) + (1 − p) W (B (b))] , (9)
W (b) = u (C (b) , X (b)) + γ v¯ + β[(1 − p) V (B (b)) + pW (B (b))] . (10)
We assume the policy functions followed by future governments are differentiable. 
Denote the implementability constraint (8) as η( c, x, b, b ′ ) and let λ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with this
constraint. The optimality conditions associated with the government problem consist of (8) and the following equations
(we economize on notation by suppressing the functional arguments): 
u c − γ v g + ληc = 0 , (11) 
u x − γ A v g + ληx = 0 , (12) 
pβV ′ b + (1 − p) βW ′ b + ληb ′ = 0 , (13) 
where the last equation contains the derivatives of the value functions given by the following expressions (see derivations
in the Appendix A ): 
V ′ b = −λ′ u ′ c , (14) 
W ′ b = u ′ c C ′ b + u ′ x X ′ b + β
[
(1 − p)(−λ′′ u ′′ c ) + p 
−λ′′ η′′ 
b ′ + βpλ′′ u ′′ c 
β(1 − p) 
]
B ′ b . (15) 
Eqs. (11) and (12) deﬁne the private-public consumption and consumption-leisure wedges caused by distortionary taxes. 
Eq. (13) speciﬁes the optimal choice of public debt to balance the current and next-period wedges taking into account
the effects of future policy on public debt accumulation. The term (1 − p) βW ′ 
b 
captures the additional cost of political
polarization/public rent-seeking. It reﬂects the effect of current government policy on future public spending if the current
incumbent is not reelected: By controlling the amount of public debt inherited next period, the current government can
partially smooth the reduction in utility associated with its possible loss of power next period. 
In the next section, we characterize the properties of the equilibrium government policy and household allocations in
more detail. 
4. Discussion 
The consensus in the theoretical literature (outlined in Section 2 ) is that political uncertainty reduces the discount factor
of the government compared to the households, leading to positive debt and higher taxes in equilibrium while political
polarization or political rent-seeking leads to overspending by the government. 
In this section we analyze whether these properties hold in the version of the economy described in the previous section.
The system of Eq. (8) , (11) –(15) , which describes the optimal solution to the government problem, is highly non-linear and
does not have analytical solution in general. First, we consider a particular example of utility function that allows a closed-
form solution to form an idea about the relationship among the variables in the model. Then, we discuss the properties of
the model in a more general case with the help of numerical analysis. 
4.1. An example of economy with analytical solution 
Consider the utility function of the party in power which is linear in leisure and public spending with weights 1 and γ
> 1, respectively; assume that the utility is logarithmic in consumption with weight a , 0 < a < (γ − 1) /γ , and normalize A
to 1. 1 
We obtain the following characterization of this economy at the steady state (proof is in the Appendix A ): 1 This example has been considered by Debortoli and Nunes (2013) in the economy without political turnover. 
D. Grechyna / Journal of Comparative Economics 44 (2016) 484–495 489 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lemma 1. At the steady state of the economy characterized by u (c t , x t ) = a ln c t + x t and γ v (g t ) = γ g t , with γ > 1, 0 < a <
(γ − 1) /γ , private consumption and leisure are increasing in public debt, public consumption is decreasing in public debt, public
debt is zero if there is no political turnover ( p = 1 ) and positive if there is political turnover (p < 1 ); higher weight on public
consumption, γ , leads to higher public spending, lower public debt and private consumption, and higher taxes. 
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is as follows. The public bonds represent government liabilities but private wealth. There-
fore, a marginal increase in public debt induces negative co-movement between private and public consumption and in-
creases leisure because of the wealth effect. The functional forms assumed result in private consumption being an increasing
function of public debt. Thus, public consumption must be a decreasing function of public debt. 
Without political turnover, the government has an incentive to manipulate the interest rate on the inherited debt (an in-
elastic asset of the households), in order to reduce the expenditure side of the budget. With private consumption increasing
in public debt, this leads to a gradual reduction in the absolute value of public debt until the steady state with zero pub-
lic debt is reached (this can be seen from (5) with utility separable in consumption and leisure: The choice of new public
bonds b ′ inﬂuences the current interest rate–inversely proportional to the bond price q –in the direction beneﬁcial to the
government whenever this period consumption increases more than the next period consumption, or whenever b ′ < b for
b > 0, b ′ > b for b < 0). 
With political turnover, the current government can partially insure itself against a possible loss of power in the next
period. If not re-elected, the government will experience a reduction in the utility by losing access to public goods that the
government enjoys (and that are not provided by the incumbent to the opposition). By issuing extra public bonds, the party
in power reduces the spending ability of the next period government and increases the next period private consumption,
thus partially smoothing the negative effect of possible non-reelection. This “tying opposition hands” strategy results in
positive public debt at the steady state with political uncertainty. 
The weight on public consumption, γ , deﬁnes the importance of public consumption relative to private consumption
for the current government. Thus, higher γ leads to higher public spending and, therefore, lower private consumption and
lower number of new public bonds issued in the current period, other things equal. 
Thus, varying the parameters γ and p can potentially produce any combination of public spending and public debt (and
the taxes are determined as a residual from the government budget constraint). 
Numerical analysis suggests that the properties of the variables in the particular example considered in this subsection
also hold for more general utility functions, as discussed below. 
4.2. A more general case 
We refer to numerical analysis to characterize the impact of political frictions on ﬁscal policy and on economic outcomes
for more general utility functions. A description of the numerical algorithm is provided in the Appendix A . We consider the
following utility of the party in power: 
U = (c 
a x 1 −a ) 1 −σ
1 − σ + γ
g 1 −ν
1 − ν . (16)
Fig. 1 shows the steady state public debt, government spending, taxes, and private consumption as functions of political
turnover ( p ) and political polarization or public rent-seeking ( γ ). We use the following parameters to construct the plots:
β = 0 . 98 , a = 0 . 3 , σ = 1 , ν = 1 , A = 1 (changing any of the parameter values within a reasonable range does not change
the qualitative behavior of the variables depicted in Fig. 1 ). 
The impact of political instability, p : Similar to the conclusions of related studies, we obtain that public debt increases
with political instability. In uncertain reelection prospects, the party in power is short-sighted relative to its electorate and
therefore is a net borrower in equilibrium. In our model, this short-sightedness is a consequence of the intertemporal insur-
ance motives by the party in power, which accumulates extra public debt to reduce government spending by the opposition
that may win the elections in the next period. If there is no political uncertainty, public debt is zero at the (stable) steady
state. Private consumption is an increasing function of public debt; thus, private consumption also increases with political
turnover. This is because the households can enjoy higher consumption from interest income on their savings in the form
of public bonds. Similar to private consumption, leisure is an increasing function of public debt; therefore, leisure increases
with political turnover. Thus, the total output is lower when political instability is higher. However, public consumption is a
decreasing function of public debt as the total resources available for public spending are lower under higher political insta-
bility. The tax rate set by the government is proportional to the marginal utility of private consumption (from the optimality
conditions of the household problem). Therefore, the income tax (and, in this economy, the tax revenues as a share of the
gross domestic product, GDP) decreases with political instability. Under higher political uncertainty, the government prefers
to ﬁnance spending by issuing debt rather than by increasing taxes. 
The impact of political polarization and/or political rent-seeking, γ : Similar to the conclusions of related studies, we
obtain that public spending increases with political polarization (or rent-seeking). This is a straightforward consequence of
polarization/rent-seeking being modeled as a value of marginal utility from government spending. Higher public spending
is ﬁnanced through income taxes that also increase with polarization. 
At the same time, given the level of political uncertainty, higher polarization or preference for rent-seeking activi-
ties reduces the equilibrium public debt level. This is a feature of the model economy: Government consumption crowds
490 D. Grechyna / Journal of Comparative Economics 44 (2016) 484–495 
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 out savings by the households in equilibrium, leading to lower levels of public debt and private consumption. The labor
supply increases (it is a decreasing function of public debt), and therefore, the total output also increases with the degree
of polarization (rent-seeking). 
At ﬁrst glance, the predictions of the model regarding the role of political polarization (or political rent-seeking) seem
controversial. Except for reducing private consumption, this political friction leads to higher output and lower public debt,
and both are usually considered an improvement in economic conditions. However, political polarization or political rent-
seeking is usually among the main causes of political turnover. If there is no disagreement in society about the composition
of public goods and if the government in power is completely benevolent, there would be no reason to throw the politicians
out of power. Therefore, the interplay between political polarization and political turnover deﬁnes the ﬁnal impact of these
political frictions on ﬁscal variables and economic outcomes. 
In the next section, we compare the data on political frictions and economic indicators in a sample of twenty developed
countries and use the model to characterize the joint inﬂuence of political (in)stability and political polarization/rent-seeking
on ﬁscal variables in the sample. 
5. Reconciling theory and data 
The aim of this section is to evaluate the contribution of political frictions to the variation in ﬁscal variables in developed
economies. First, we discuss the properties of the data on political and economic variables in a sample of twenty developed
countries (the sample size is dictated by the availability of all necessary data). Second, we project the data on political
frictions into the model to calculate the ﬁscal and economic variables in the model and compare the results with the data
characteristics. 
We use the following economic indicators (the data are from the World Bank and the OECD Statistics): general govern-
ment debt ( b g / y ), central government debt ( b c / y ), government consumption ( g / y ), and private consumption ( c / y ) shares of
GDP; real GDP ( y ); and taxes on income and proﬁts ( τ ). We consider general government debt and central government debt
to check the robustness of the results. All data are averaged over the time period 1995-2007. This time period is dictated
by the data availability (the common measures of public rent-seeking are available starting in 1995) and by the absence of
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Table 1 
The data. 
Country p γ c 1 γ c 2 γ p 1 γ p 2 y b g / y b c / y g / y τ c / y 
Australia 1 .023 0 .517 0 .115 2 .555 2 .294 0 .804 0 .403 0 .239 0 .175 0 .236 0 .578 
Austria 1 .106 0 .491 0 .127 2 .569 2 .101 0 .928 0 .699 0 .647 0 .191 0 .282 0 .543 
Belgium 0 .927 0 .740 0 .151 2 .924 2 .729 0 .890 1 .119 1 .041 0 .215 0 .258 0 .520 
Canada 0 .992 0 .487 0 .113 2 .663 2 .214 0 .856 1 .087 0 .622 0 .198 0 .149 0 .554 
Denmark 1 .221 0 .409 0 .104 2 .148 2 .238 1 .188 0 .507 0 .406 0 .243 0 .318 0 .485 
Finland 1 .539 0 .406 0 .104 2 .583 2 .086 0 .901 0 .443 0 .571 0 .210 0 .221 0 .496 
France 0 .567 0 .738 0 .145 2 .978 2 .219 0 .853 0 .715 0 .639 0 .226 0 .174 0 .549 
Germany 0 .973 0 .523 0 .127 2 .284 2 .704 0 .870 0 .626 0 .412 0 .187 0 .107 0 .569 
Ireland 1 .303 0 .641 0 .130 2 .749 2 .276 1 .104 0 .319 0 .374 0 .160 0 .256 0 .464 
Italy 0 .652 2 .133 0 .212 2 .729 2 .214 0 .795 1 .084 1 .182 0 .184 0 .227 0 .593 
Japan 1 .063 0 .881 0 .146 2 .201 1 .851 0 .892 1 .403 1 .403 0 .171 0 .101 0 .568 
Luxembourg 1 .411 0 .518 0 .118 2 .606 2 .468 1 .861 0 .066 0 .043 0 .154 0 .251 0 .388 
Netherlands 1 .174 0 .465 0 .113 2 .025 1 .860 1 .011 0 .610 0 .561 0 .218 0 .211 0 .487 
Norway 1 .299 0 .467 0 .113 2 .264 1 .906 1 .603 0 .436 0 .351 0 .204 0 .317 0 .450 
Portugal 1 .130 0 .853 0 .155 2 .356 2 .727 0 .463 0 .627 0 .666 0 .192 0 .214 0 .639 
Spain 0 .073 0 .806 0 .157 2 .858 2 .494 0 .628 0 .574 0 .526 0 .171 0 .157 0 .587 
Sweden 1 .319 0 .445 0 .108 2 .221 1 .924 1 .004 0 .640 0 .535 0 .251 0 .258 0 .463 
Switzerland 1 .314 0 .469 0 .114 3 .073 2 .381 1 .353 0 .537 0 .259 0 .111 0 .091 0 .577 
The UK 0 .563 0 .496 0 .117 2 .547 2 .186 0 .941 0 .436 0 .473 0 .186 0 .259 0 .635 
The USA 0 .392 0 .616 0 .132 2 .567 2 .239 1 .053 0 .738 0 .449 0 .147 0 .112 0 .663 
Notation: p - political stability measure; γ c 1 and γ c 2 - public rent-seeking measures; γ p 1 and γ p 2 - political polarization 
measures; y - real GDP per capita (normalized); b g / y -general government debt share of GDP; b c / y - central government 
debt share of GDP; g / y - public consumption share of GDP; τ - taxes; c / y - private consumption share of GDP. Data 
Sources: the World Bank, the OECD Statistics, Transparency International, Lindqvist and Östling (2010) . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 signiﬁcant economic ﬂuctuations during that period. The levels of real GDP in every country in the sample are normalized
by the average real GDP across all countries in the sample. 
To reduce the consequences of the data limitations, we consider several indicators of political frictions. We use the
inverse of the Worldwide Governance Indicators variable “Control of Corruption” and the inverse of the Transparency In-
ternational Corruption Perception Index as measures of public rent-seeking (we denote these variables as γ c 1 and γ c 2 ,
respectively). We use the “SD_EQUALITY” and “SD_PRIVATE” variables from Lindqvist and Östling (2010) to measure political
polarization (we denote these variables as γ p 1 and γ p 2 , respectively). Finally, we use the Worldwide Governance Indicators
variable “Political Stability and Absence of Violence” as a measure of political stability (we denote it as p ). All variables are
listed in Table 1 . 
Comparison of the data across countries suggests that countries characterized by higher output per capita and lower
consumption per capita are also characterized by higher political stability, lower public rent-seeking, and lower public debt
levels (though, there is no clear relationship between the output and the political polarization measures). For example,
Luxembourg has the highest GDP in the sample and one of the highest levels of political stability combined with one of
the lowest levels of public rent-seeking and the lowest level of public debt in the sample. Italy has one of the lowest levels
of political stability combined with one of the highest levels of political polarization and the highest level of public rent-
seeking in the sample. At the same time, Italy is characterized by one of the highest levels of public debt, relatively high
public consumption, and relatively low output compared with other countries in the sample. 
In Table 2 , we summarize the signs of the correlation coeﬃcients among the ﬁscal, economic, and political variables
in the model, keeping one of the two political frictions ﬁxed, and in the data. Given that we have several measures of
political friction γ , we report the average correlation coeﬃcient across γ c 1 , γ c 2 , γ p 1 , and γ p 2 and the variables of interest
in Table 2 (the correlation coeﬃcients are similar across different measures of γ for all the variables except for public debt).
The results reported in Table 2 suggest that in the model and in the data, government spending and taxes increase with
political stability, are positively correlated among themselves, and are negatively correlated with private consumption; gov-
ernment debt and private consumption shares of the GDP decrease with political stability, are positively correlated among
themselves, and are negatively correlated with taxes; and output is positively correlated with taxes and negatively corre-
lated with public debt and consumption shares. The signs are opposite in the model and in the data for the correlations of γ
(averages across the measures in the data) with the GDP, taxes, and public debt and public spending shares of the GDP, and
for the correlations of government spending with GDP and public debt share of the GDP. In order to evaluate the model’s
performance in capturing the relationship among ﬁscal variables, we should account for the existence of the relationship
between p and γ , which are negatively correlated in the data (the average of the correlations between γ c 1 , γ c 2 , γ p 1 , or γ p 2
and p -0.42). 
Therefore, we calibrate the model discussed in the previous sections to a sample of twenty economies. The sample based
on developed countries and the data based on the averages over a relatively long period of time justify the approximation
of these economies by the model at the steady state . 
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Table 2 
The signs of the correlations and the correlation coeﬃcients 
among political and economic variables in the model and in 
the data. 
Corr. Data Model Corr. Data Model 
y, p 0 .47 + b / y, y −0 .48 −
b / y, p −0 .29 − g / y, y −0 .22 + 
g / y, p 0 .13 + c / y, y −0 .67 −
τ , p 0 .34 + τ , y 0 .26 + 
c / y, p −0 .67 − b / y, τ −0 .39 −
y, γ −0 .30 + g / y, τ 0 .52 + 
b / y, γ 0 .23 − c / y, τ −0 .53 −
g / y, γ −0 .29 + g / y, b / y 0 .13 −
τ , γ −0 .22 + c / y, b / y 0 .39 + 
c / y, γ 0 .34 + c / y, g / y −0 .32 −
Notation: the columns titled “Data” contain the correlation 
coeﬃcients in the data. For the political polarization/rent- 
seeking measure γ , the correlation coeﬃcients are the av- 
erages across the measures of political polarization/rent- 
seeking. The columns titled “Model” contain the signs of the 
correlation coeﬃcients in the model. The exact values of the 
correlations in the model depend on the model parameters. 
The correlations that have opposite sign in the model and in 
the data are presented in bold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We ﬁx the discount factor to match the average return on government bonds in the considered economies, β = 0 . 98 ,
and we choose the utility parameters to match the average public spending share of GDP across all countries in the sample:
a = 0 . 3 . We assume separable utility, logarithmic in all arguments: σ = 1 , ν = 1 . 2 
The political stability variable in the model, p , is interpreted as the probability that the incumbent will stay in power in
the given period of time; this variable must lie in the interval [0,1]. The World Bank measure of political stability varies in
the range [ −2.5; 2.5]. Therefore, we need to re-scale the data on p in order to be able to use this variable in the model.
Moreover, political turnover can in general depend on public rent-seeking or political polarization and vice versa, as we
discussed above. We proceed as follows. We choose two countries, characterized by the highest and lowest levels of political
stability (Finland and Spain, see Table 1 ) and compute the values of A, p , and γ necessary to replicate the GDP, public debt,
and public consumption in these countries. Let us denote the resulting political friction measures for Finland and Spain as
p m 
F inland 
, p m 
Spain 
, and γm 
F inland 
, γm 
Spain 
. Then, we can state the following relationship between these model-generated variables
and corresponding measures from the data, p d 
F inland 
, p d 
Spain 
, and γ d 
F inland 
, γ d 
Spain 
: 
p m F inland = 1 − 1 / (η1 p d F inland + η2 γ d F inland ) , (17) 
p m Spain = 1 − 1 / (η1 p d Spain + η2 γ d Spain ) . (18) 
γ m F inland = 1 / (μ1 p d F inland + μ2 γ d F inland ) , (19) 
γ m Spain = 1 / (μ1 p d Spain + μ2 γ d Spain ) . (20) 
The functional forms used in (17) and (18) restrict the probability of re-election in the model to lie between zero and one.
The coeﬃcients η1 , η2 , μ1 , and μ2 determined by the systems of equations (17) - (18) and ( 19 )- (20) can be used to re-scale
the political frictions measures from the data to the political frictions in the model. 
Finally, we calculate the values of the ﬁscal variables (public debt, government spending, and taxes) predicted by the
model given the re-scaled measures of political frictions from the data and choosing the parameter A for each country so
that the output generated by the model is the same as the output of this country in the data. 
The estimation results are summarized in Table 3 that reports the correlation coeﬃcients between the variables gener-
ated by the model and the data for different measures of γ . 
Table 3 suggests that the World Bank Governance Indicators measure of rent-seeking ( γ c 1 ) and the Transparency Inter-
national measure of public rent-seeking ( γ c 2 ) produce similar results (columns named “γ c 1 ” and “γ c 2 ”): The correlation
coeﬃcients between the model-generated variables and the data are around 50% for public debt and around 30% for public2 We should note that the calibration results discussed in this section are robust to changes in the parameters β , a, σ , and υ, and hold for different 
forms of the utility function u ( c, x ), e.g., the utility function separable in consumption and leisure and the GHH utility function). 
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Table 3 
Calibration results: the correlation coeﬃcients between the variables generated by the model with polit- 
ical frictions and the data. 
Corr. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
γ c 1 γ c 2 γ p 1 γ p 2 γ c 1 γ c 2 γ p 1 γ p 2 
( b m , b d ) 0 .521 0 .532 0 .140 0 .051 0 .437 0 .433 0 .132 −0 .023 
( g m , g d ) 0 .354 0 .328 0 .424 0 .306 0 .267 0 .239 0 .460 0 .262 
( τm , τ d ) 0 .319 0 .292 0 .365 0 .314 0 .202 0 .166 0 .288 0 .284 
( y m , y d ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Notation: b - government debt; g - public consumption; τ - taxes; y - output; γ c 1 and γ c 2 - public 
rent-seeking measures; γ p 1 and γ p 2 - political polarization measures; ( V 
m , V d ) - denotes the correlation 
between variable V in the model and in the data. Columns (1)–(4) and (5)–(8) report the results when the 
central government debt and the general government debt is considered in the calibration, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 spending and taxes, when we use the central government debt as a measure of public debt. When we use the general gov-
ernment debt, the correlation coeﬃcients between the model-generated variables and the data are around 43% for public
debt and around 20% for public spending and taxes. However, the political polarization measures from Lindqvist and Östling
(2010) , γ p 1 and γ p 2 , produce correlation coeﬃcients of around 30% between the public spending generated by the model
and public spending in the data, with similar result for income taxes, but insigniﬁcant correlation between the model-
generated and empirically observed public debt. Given that political instability data combined with public rent-seeking data
explain around 25% of the variation in public debt levels, we conclude that the public rent-seeking measures outperform
the political polarization measures in explaining the variation in ﬁscal variables in the sample of developed economies. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we evaluated the role of political frictions for public policy outcomes, using a parsimonious model of ﬁscal
policy. We conclude that political turnover (or political uncertainty/instability) increases public debt levels while political
polarization or public rent-seeking leads to higher public spending. When the measures of political frictions from a sample
of twenty developed countries are incorporated into the model, political instability data combined with public rent-seeking
data explain around 25% of the variation in public debt levels. 
The analysis in this paper suggests several directions for further research. One important variable through which public
policy affects economic variables and which is missing from the model is capital formation. Political frictions can distort
investment ( Azzimonti, 2011 ), which in turn has consequences for private consumption and leisure. However, in many at-
tempts to solve the economy model with both physical capital and public debt we did not succeed in ﬁnding stationary
solutions to the model; related discussion on the problems of such models can be found in Ortigueira et al. (2012) . More-
over, there may be other factors inﬂuencing ﬁscal variables in developed countries, such as, for example, the interest rate
(which in the steady state of the model is ﬁxed at 1/ β for all the countries), ﬁnancial markets, openness to trade, or pro-
longed economic shocks. Extending the model to include other frictions, such as imperfect ﬁnancial markets and default
risk, or exogenous economic shocks, could help to clarify the importance of political frictions in comparison to other ma-
jor factors affecting public policy and economic performance in developed countries. Finally, additional investigation on the
determinants of political polarization, public rent-seeking, and their connection with political uncertainty could give more
insights on the main political drivers of ﬁscal distortions. 
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Appendix A. Derivation of the government optimality conditions 
The ﬁrst order conditions associated with the government problem are the following: 
u c − γ v g + ληc = 0 , (21)
u x − γ A v g + ληx = 0 , (22)
pβV ′ b + (1 − p) βW ′ b + ληb ′ = 0 , (23)
where 
ηc = u cc c + u c − u xc (1 − x ) − u cc b, 
ηx = u cx c − u xx (1 − x ) + u xx − u cx b, 
ηb ′ = β(u ′ cc b ′ C b + u ′ cx b ′ X b + u ′ c ) . 
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 In order to ﬁnd V b , totally differentiate the value function V ( b ) given by (9) with respect to b : 
V b = u c C b + u x X b − γ v g C b (b) − γ A v g X b + β(pV ′ b + (1 − p) W ′ b ) B b . 
Substituting (21) –(23) in the last expression and simplifying using the fact that ηc C b + ηx X b + ηb + ηb ′ B b = 0 , obtain the
following expression for V b : 
V b = −λu c . (24) 
In order to ﬁnd W b , totally differentiate the value function W ( b ), given by (10) , with respect to b : 
W b = u c C b + u x X b + β((1 − p) V ′ b + pW ′ b ) B b . 
Using (23) and (24) to express W ′ 
b 
and V ′ 
b 
and substitute them into (24) , obtain the following expression for W b : 
W b = u c C b + u x X b + β
[
(1 − p)(−λ′ u ′ c ) + p 
−λ′ η′ 
b ′ + βpλ′ u ′ c 
β(1 − p) 
]
B b . (25) 
The expressions (14) and (15) in the text are equations (24) and (25) updated one period. 
Proof of Lemma 1. The optimality conditions (8), (11) and (12) with the instantaneous utility considered in the example
simplify as follows: 
a + βa/c ′ b ′ − 1 + x − ab/c = 0 , (26) 
a/c − γ + λab/c 2 = 0 , (27) 
1 − γ + λ = 0 , (28) 
Eq. (27) is quadratic in consumption and can be solved for consumption as a function of public debt. The following root fea-
tures positive consumption: C (b) = a (1 + (1 + 4(γ − 1) bγ /a ) 0 . 5 ) / (2 γ ) , from where C b > 0. From (26) , X b = βa/c 2 ′ C ′ b b ′ B ′ b −
βa/c ′ 
b 
B ′ 
b 
+ a/c − ab/c 2 C b , which, evaluated at the stable steady state is equal to (1 − βB ′ b ) a/c(1 − b/cC b ) > 0 , because 0 <
b / c C b < 1. 
Then, from the resource constraint (1) , G b < 0. Increasing the weight on public spending increases g , thus b, x , and c
decrease. From the optimality condition of the household problem, taxes are negatively related to private consumption, so
they increase when private consumption decrease. 
Finally, from (12) evaluated at the steady state and given that X b and C b are positive for any b , b = 0 if p = 1 and b > 0
if 0 < p < 1. ‖ 
Numerical algorithm 
To solve the system of Eqs. (8) , (11) –(15) , the unknown policy functions are approximated by the Hermite polynomials
of second order. That is, 
C (b) = ∑ n i =0 a c,i H i (b) , 
X (b) = ∑ n i =0 a x,i H i (b) , 
B (b) = ∑ n i =0 a b,i H i (b) , 
(29) 
where n = 2 and H i ( b ) denotes the Hermite polynomial of order i , and a Y, i denotes the coeﬃcient of the policy function Y
associated with the Hermite polynomial of order i . Given the functional forms in ( 29 ), the solution to the original system
with λ substituted away, consists of ﬁnding 3 ∗n unknown coeﬃcients 
{ a c,i , a x,i , a b,i } n i =1 . (30) 
The system of Eqs. (8) , (11) –(13) , with the derivatives of value functions substituted from (14) and (15) and λ substituted
away by combining (11) and (12) , contains only three equations; the additional equations can be obtained by differentiating
the original system with respect to the state of the economy, b . The ﬁrst and second differentials of each of the three original
equations, together with the original equations, all evaluated at the steady state, can be solved for the unknown coeﬃcients
(30) . 
As a by-product of this numerical algorithm, the stability of the system ( 8 ), (11) –(15) at the steady state can be analyzed:
if the ﬁrst derivative of the policy function B ( b ) has an absolute value of less than 1, corresponding steady state of the system
is asymptotically stable. The results reported in the main text are associated with the stable steady state of the model. 
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